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Under the ruling, EPA could obtain such assurances for past RCRA
violations regardless of whether PEC was acting in violation of the
statute at the time EPA filed its complaint.
The court also found PEC's "tremendous progress" argument
unpersuasive. PEC believed that because it had taken substantial steps
toward remediating the contaminated soils and groundwater, the EPA
could not establish irreparable injury occurred necessary to warrant an
injunction. The court first noted that because PEC had not provided
the financial assurances demanded by the EPA, PEC was in current
violation of RCRA. Citing Tenth Circuit authority, the court found
that "[w]hen the evidence shows that the defendants are engaged
in... practices prohibited by statute.., irreparable harm to the
plaintiffs need not be shown."
PEC's laches argument rested on the premise that because the
government did not act against PEC at an earlier time, the EPA had
abandoned its right to do so. Recognizing an exception to the laches
doctrine exists where the government seeks to protect a public
interest, PEC opined that the EPA's suit served a government, rather
than a public interest. Rejecting this assertion, the court reasoned that
if PEC were not to provide remediation costs, the government would
be forced to do so; these costs in turn would be passed to the public.
Because a public interest was therefore at stake, PEC's laches
argument could not stand.
Lilienthal individually asserted the final response to EPA's motion
for partial summaryjudgment. Lilienthal argued he was not in fact the
operator of the PEC facility. The court disposed of this argument by
simply applying the wording of Colorado regulations to pertinent facts
regarding Lilienthal's holdings. At the time the EPA brought its
action, Lilienthal was president of PEC and owned over half its stock.
According to PEC employee testimony, Lilienthal also made all the
relevant decisions regarding PEC's environmental compliance. The
court recognized other courts have used different tests to determine
whether to consider an individual as an operator for RCRA purposes.
However, the court declined to decide which test courts should apply
since Lilienthal would be considered an operator under each of them.
Jason S. Wells
Burke v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.D.C. 2001)
(granting summary judgment motion in favor of the Environmental
Protection Agency where a violator of a discharge permit questioned
the agency's decision to debar him from business with the
government).
From 1989 to 1998, Burke was the president and sole shareholder
of ACMAR Regional Landfill, Inc. ("ACMAR"), which owned and
operated ACMAR Regional Landfill ("the landfill") located in
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Alabama. The landfill accepted residential and industrial waste, and
bordered a tributary of the Cahaba River, a source of drinking water
for the residents of Birmingham, Alabama. The Alabama Department
of Environmental Management issued a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit to the landfill, which authorized the release
of landfill storm water runoff that did not contain leachate, a liquid byproduct produced in landfills. Leachate results when precipitation or
other fluids mix with contaminates in the waste creating a biological
reaction that renders the fluid harmful. In February 1998, an
information was filed against Burke charging him with a violation of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama for negligent discharge of leachate
into the Chahaba River tributary in 1993. Burke pled guilty and
received a fine and prison sentence, with a one year supervised release
if he continued his relationship with the landfill. ACMAR pled guilty
to charges of fraud and illegal operation of the landfill and
subsequently received a fine. Burke sold the landfill in March 1998.
In August 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
Suspension and Debarment Division debarred Burke from
participating in any federal assistance program and from contracting
with the federal government for five years. The EPA exercised its
discretion in debarring Burke to protect the public interest and ensure
the agency conducted business with only responsible persons. The
EPA concluded Burke's criminal conviction provided just cause for
debarment, and Burke did not provide sufficient mitigating factors or
remedial measures to show debarment was unnecessary. Burke filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking an injunction against the EPA in reference to the debarment
order, and declaratory relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act. Burke argued the EPA's decision to debar him was arbitrary and
capricious given the statutory requirement for debarment, and the
mitigating factors and remedial measures surrounding his offense.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.
In reviewing the decision to debar Burke, the court stated the
standard of review was not to determine if the decision was proper, but
to determine whether the EPA had acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner looking at the entire administrative record. The
court held the EPA acted within its discretion given the evidence and
granted summary judgment for the EPA.
First, the court addressed Burke's claim that the EPA's
interpretation of the CWA debarment provision constituted an abuse
of discretion. Burke argued the relevant sections of the debarment
provision neither specifically enumerated nor generally addressed the
nature of his offense, but rather referred to business integrity. The
court concluded Burke's actions raised considerable questions about
his business integrity and the EPA's interpretation of the provision was
reasonable.
Next, the court addressed Burke's argument regarding the
mitigating factors and remedial measures surrounding his debarment.
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Burke argued the mitigating factors surrounding his offense made
debarment unnecessary, as he did not represent a business risk, and
these mitigating factors made his five-year debarment period excessive.
Burke maintained his offense was a single act and not a pattern of
offenses, making him less of a business risk in future relationships.
The court explained that the scope of its review was to decide whether
the EPA acted reasonably given the facts in the record, and that the
EPA had discretion in making its decision. The court held, given the
nature and circumstances of Burke's offense, that EPA's decision to
debar him for five years was not an abuse of discretion.
PatrickNackley
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 237 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding section 509(b) (1) of the Clean Water Act determines venue,
notjurisdiction).
In April 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
promulgated regulations, known as the "Cluster Rules," pertaining to
the paper mill and pulp industry. The Cluster Rules include both
effluent limitation guidelines under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and
Several
emission standards under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").
environmental groups, including the National Wildlife Federation
(collectively, "NWF"), filed a petition for review of the CWA portion of
the Cluster Rules in the Ninth Circuit. Various paper producers
(collectively, "Industry petitioners") filed a petition for review of the
same portion of the Cluster Rules in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits.
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits transferred the Industry
petitioners to the Ninth Circuit, where the court consolidated their
petition for review with NWF's claims. Industry petitioners then
motioned to dismiss NWF's petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Without ruling, the Ninth Circuit transferred the case to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
CWA section 509(b) (1) provided the basis for the Industry
petitioner's lack of subject matter jurisdiction argument. This section
states that review of an administrator's action in promulgating any
effluent standard may be had in the "Circuit Court of Appeals of the
United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person
resides or transacts business which is directly affected by such action."
Industry petitioners argued the phrase "resides or transacts" was
jurisdictional and only one of the NWF petitioners resided or
transacted business in the Ninth Circuit. Industry petitioners asserted
that because NWF's one valid petitioner lost standing, or its claim
became moot, nine months after NWF's petition was filed, NWF's
remaining petition should be dismissed. NWF countered that the
"resides or transacts" language referred to venue, and argued venue
was properly established.
In analyzing Industry petitioners' and NWF's arguments, the court

